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I. Introduction
Innovations in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) exploitation
motivated companies and investors to develop strategic techniques
that facilitate the indirect application of IPRs as tools for achieving
competitive goals. A companion article' details a further innovation
in the indirect application of IPRs, one in which companies do not
even need to own IPRs in order to consequentially benefit from their
exploitation, which has been labeled "IP privateering." This article
explores certain practical considerations of the IP privateering
strategy, such as a target's possible counterclaims against the sponsor
and how a sponsor may outfit a privateering operation.
1. Thomas Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights By
Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4
HASTINGS SCI. &TECH. L. J. 1 (2011).
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A. An Overview of IP Privateering & Its Competitive Background
Competitive pressures have stimulated increasing interest in
IPRs and strategies related to their commercial exploitation during
the past thirty years of the ongoing pro-patent era. IP managers have
explored innovations in the use of IP assets as competitive tools in
their own right. The majority of these strategies could be classified as
"direct uses" in which a company exploits IPRs developed from the
company's own R&D activities. IP managers honed techniques for
conventional IP asset exploitation tools, including but not limited to
patent licensing and assertion programs. Over time, innovative IP
managers developed techniques for the indirect application of IP
assets. These indirect techniques have included buying third-party
patents in the technology markets for assertion against competitors
and acquiring third-party patents for use in a countersuit in an
ongoing infringement litigation.
Increasing IPRs competition stimulated the development of
robust IPR markets2 and the increasing presence of intermediaries
entering the market.' The rich varieties of IPRs available in these
markets enabled the further development of indirect IPR strategies.
Over time, these intermediaries have become more and more
specialized.4  While many intermediaries work towards the further
development of a robust market for the efficient exchange of IP
2. See HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION. THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR
CREATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (Harvard Business School Press,
2003);.ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA ET AL., STUDY ON EVALUATING THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY: WHAT ARE PATENTS ACTUALLY WORTH? THE VALUE OF PATENTS FOR
TODAY'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (2006).
3. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, European Patent
Office, Intellectual Property as an Economic Asset: Key Issues In Valuation And
Exploitation 8 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/2/35519266.pdf
("Many large firms have developed internal capabilities for patent management and
licensing, but as in other markets a diverse set of intermediaries has also emerged to foster
technology markets, more so in the United States than in Europe. Intermediaries include
technology licensing offices at public research organisations, Internet-based portals and
private firms that offer advice and actively link buyers and sellers of technology. Each
type of intermediary has a different customer focus and different level of involvement in
transactions, but all play important roles in facilitating partnerships, ensuring
confidentiality of partners in a transaction (e.g. protecting privacy in negotiations to avoid
competitors knowing about the parties' interests), offering expertise (need to ensure that
the deal corresponds to the parties' needs) and providing an external perspective on the
negotiation.").
4. IRENE TROY & RAYMUND WERLE, UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET FOR
PATENTS, (2008), available at: www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wpO8-2.pdf.
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assets,5 these same intermediaries can obviously serve indirect
exploitation uses extremely well. Patent brokers can conduct
negotiations for anonymous parties; patent valuation firms can assist
in estimating settlement amounts, and patent acquisition firms,
including auction houses, can assist in transitioning patents from one
owner to a new, privateering owner. Patent law firms can support all
of these functions as well as pioneering new roles not otherwise found
in the marketplace.6
Over time, what might have once been a fairly simple
arrangement within the innovation system has evolved into a complex
IPR ecosystem.7 The evolving IPR ecosystem features many kinds of
entities, distinct business models, patent profiles, and patent
strategies.' The most noticeable contemporary players in this
ecosystem are the large companies holding enormous portfolios and
the aggressive non-practicing entities (NPEs). The aggressive NPEs
have emerged in recent years from beyond their early prototypes, in
part due to the quality of IPRs available in the market. Billions of
new capital has flowed into NPEs such as Intellectual Ventures
("IV"), Acacia, RPX, Round Rock Research, and many others.9
These actors play significant roles in shaping the innovation system
and interact continuously with other participants such as individual
inventors, small companies, research labs and universities.
Operating companies have sought to replicate the IPR strategies
of the NPEs in a further refinement of indirect IP strategies. The
innovations coalesced as "IP privateering," the beneficial application
of third-party IPRs for a sponsoring entity against a competitor to
achieve a corporate goal of the sponsor. In an IP privateering
engagement, a corporation or investor serving as the sponsor employs
third-party IPRs as competitive tools. The privateer, a specialized
5. CHESBROUGH, supra note 2.
6. Specialized patent law firms have been around for more than one hundred years.
See Bristows at-a-glance, BRISTOWS, http://www.bristows.com/about-us/key-facts (last
visited Oct. 9, 2011).
7. See, e.g., Brian Kahin, The Patent Ecosystem in IT: Business Practice and
Arbitrage, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 5, 2008) (submission based on remarks
before the Federal Trade Commission), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/
ipmarketplace/dec5/docs/bkahin2.pdf.
8. Id. at 4-5.
9. For a comprehensive list of four of Intellectual Venture's seven investment funds
see Ewing, supra note 1, at Appendix 1.
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form of NPE,'0 asserts the IPRs against target companies selected by
the sponsor. The sponsor's benefits do not typically arise directly
from the third party's case against a target but arise consequentially
from the changed competitive environment brought about by the
third party's IPR assertion. As discussed in a companion article," the
sponsor's benefits may include nudging the target into a less
competitive position, facilitating the licensing of a larger collection of
the sponsor's own IPRs, and causing a beneficial change to the
target's share price and/or corporate valuation. The third-party
privateer's motivation comprises collecting a litigation settlement or
damages award.
IP privateering, as used herein, is defined as: the assertion of
IPRs by an entity (the privateer), typically in the form of an NPE,
against a target company for the direct benefit of the privateer and
the consequential benefit of a sponsor, where the consequential
benefits are significantly greater than the direct benefits. The
strategy, in part, relies upon the intransparencies of ownership and
motivation permitted in the IP system.
Privateering can be shaped to fit many competitive scenarios."
Privateering may be used by operating companies to change the
technology adoption rate between an upstart technology and an
incumbent technology, to outsource the licensing of a larger
collection of IPRs, and to change some aspect of the legal
infrastructure. Privateering may be used by investors to grow existing
investments by privateering against competitors in a given technology
area, to change the value of the stock price of a public company to
temporarily discount its shares and/or to facilitate short selling, to
change a company's value during investment, and to recoup
investment research and analysis costs. Outsourcing patent litigation,
one branch of privateering, allows companies to shape their
competitive environments and in some instances monetize their IP
rights at extremely low cost. Sponsoring corporations tend to set the
objectives for a privateering operation, assist in assembling the
necessary resources for carrying out the plan, and then step aside
10. This article uses the conventional NPE acronym rather than the patent assertion
entity (PAE) acronym recently advanced by the Federal Trade Commission. See The
Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2011) at 8, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/10307
patentreport.pdf.
11. Ewing, supra note 1.
12. See id.
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from further hands-on management. Playing a more active role could
show the corporate sponsor's hand, the very hand that needs to be
obscured in order for the privateering effort to work properly.
IP privateering takes its name from an historic method of waging
war so effective that it had to be abolished by treaty. 3 "Privateering,"
as it was called, was effective and cheap-the privateer's actions cost
the sponsoring government nothing. Privateering, like the creation of
corporations, allowed governments to pursue policy objectives
without any impact on the treasury. In short, classical privateering
removed most obstacles to waging war, save for the opponent's ability
to retaliate. IP privateering similarly has the opponent's ability to
retaliate as its greatest obstacle, hence the importance of stealth to
the sponsor.
Indirect exploitation of IPRs via intermediaries14 does not per se
give rise to a specific legal cause of action against the sponsor in most
scenarios. In fact, the sponsor's potential legal liability rarely exceeds
that of the third-party privateer who carries out the sponsor's IPR
assertion plan. If the privateer avoids liability, so does the sponsor in
most instances. Potential sponsor legal liability may give rise to
causes of action ranging from tortious interference in business
relations to patent misuse, as well as possible market manipulation
charges and antitrust problems. A sponsor's greatest potential
liability likely rests on adverse business consequences, particularly
from public exposure of the sponsor's involvement. Indeed, a
sponsor's goals for a privateering operation are often defeated by
public exposure. For example, IP privateering only thwarts the
"mutually assured destruction" paradigm of defensive patenting so
long as the operating company sponsor can hide its links to the
privateer and/or plausibly deny control over the privateer.
Privateering can often achieve the sponsor's aims well before a
decision on the merits of the case brought by the privateer.
B. Purposes and Research Question
This article explores aspects of IP privateering, a strategy in
which companies do not even need to own IPRs in order to
13. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, ICRC (Apr.
16, 1856) available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/105?OpenDocument.
14. These intermediaries can perform more than a mere "outsourced" litigation
function. The intermediary's bringing litigation against a target changes the relative
competitive landscape between the target and the sponsor to the sponsor's advantage such
that the sponsor often benefits whether or not the litigation succeeds.
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consequentially benefit from their exploitation. This Article
specifically aims to achieve the following purposes:
To explore the options available to targets to retaliate against
privateering sponsors and to gauge the extent to which present law is
adequate for enjoining privateering where it is discovered.
To evaluate the limits of the commercial uses for this strategy
among both corporations and investors.
These research questions are clarified as follows.
1. To what extent can targets of privateering attacks retaliate
against the sponsors simply for privateering alone, as
opposed to other causes of action?
This first research question explores what actions differently
situated targets could launch against a privateering sponsor
once its presence is discovered. This investigation focuses
primarily on legal counterclaims that the target could bring,
and specifically focuses on legal counterclaims that the
target could bring simply based upon the act of motivating a
third party's litigation.
2. What are the limits on deployment of this strategy by
commercial actors?
This second second research question intends to gauge the
extent to which commercial actors may employ the IP
privateering strategy. Among other things, an examination
is conducted of the ease with which a sponsor may find IPRs
in the open market suitable for a privateering operation.
A companion paper explores two foundational research
questions." The first research question in that article concerns
collecting instances of IP privateering and providing an organizational
framework for applications of this strategy. The second research
question concerns gauging the extent to which the existing innovation
system is sufficiently robust to accommodate the indirect uses of
IPRs, such as privateering, and to examine if the components of the
innovation system should be more explicitly linked together into an
integrated whole.
15. See Ewing, supra note 1.
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C. Scope, Limitations, and Methodology
The impact of IP privateering can be interpreted in many ways
depending on the purposes and scope of the study. This Article has
the following scope of analysis and limitations of the results:
1. This study primarily focuses on the identification of an IP
strategy that has not previously been identified although it may
have been practiced privately for a number of years by various
commercial actors. The study explores aspects of this strategy
and further studies the potential limitations on its usage. The
practitioners' needs for secrecy make collecting actual cases
difficult, although many have been collected, and they amount to
several billion dollars in economic activity. Nevertheless, the
number of cases presently known is limited, rendering it difficult
to undertake the types of statistical analyses that one would
prefer to utilize.
2. The study is implemented primarily in the United States using
US patents and considering the U.S. legal system. Therefore it
does not provide a detailed investigation regarding other
countries, apart from one possible instance of IP privateering in
Germany. Thus, the boundaries and limitations on the strategy
discussed in Parts II and III may be substantially different in
other legal systems. As a result, the strategy may possibly be
differently deployable in other legal settings, and possibly not
available at all.
The methodology here has focused on exploratory research,
employing various techniques for probing the possible range of IP
privateering activity. Once a greater data set of privateering cases has
become available, then much more sophisticated empirical analysis
can be conducted.
6
The range and potential forms of privateering, which comprise
Parts II and III, probe the theoretical limits of what corporate and
investor actors could achieve with the privateering strategy and the
practical difficulties in equipping a privateer. Part I1 investigates the
limits to which a risk-averse commercial actor may pursue the
strategy while still minimizing any possible negative consequences.
16. Many of the managers and practitioners contacted for this research declined to
participate on the grounds of confidentiality. As more information about the strategy
becomes available, managers and practitioners are likely to become less concerned, albeit
not unconcerned, with certain aspects of confidentiality.
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Part III discusses practical aspects of finding IPRs to employ in a
privateering operation.
This investigation applies existing case law as a methodological
touchstone against which any commercial actor would be compelled
to test privateering strategies or defenses against the privateering
strategies of others. Since there is an absence of case law related to
IP privateering, per se, I would assume that an entity considering a
privateering operation would likely seek legal advice regarding the
possibilities for and limitations of such a strategy-and the attorneys
providing such advice would be compelled to analyze existing case
law in order to predict the range of claims that a target could bring
and how a court would react to them. The analysis here attempts to
replicate what such advice would most likely resemble under the
assumption that the collective mass of such advice would define the
effective exploitation limits for the strategy, at least initially, until a
body of privateering case law develops in its own right. In this sense,
the methodology mirrors that of the early American legal realists,
particularly Holmes' predictive theory of law.17 In essence, the
assumption is that the boundaries of a commercial behavior not
specifically and expressly subject itself to legal prohibition or
regulation will likely be pursued by the reasonable commercial actor
in terms of something akin to a cost/benefit analysis.
As Granstrand has observed, law and economics often follow
differing methodologies while attempting to find answers to common
problems.'8 Economics tends to focus on the aggregate while law
tends to focus on specific instances. Thus, one discipline tends to start
high and work downward while the other discipline starts small and
works up. The IP field lends itself to hybrid approaches. Among
other things, IP rights are legal rights that have significance only so
long as they can be enforced in court while the motivations for using
these rights are almost entirely economic. Thus, the hybrid nature of
the IP field arises from its fundamental elements.
Methodologies such as questionnaires and structured interviews
have not seemed applicable for this research because many IP
managers are not yet aware of the strategy and those IP managers
who are aware of the strategy generally have an interest, and possibly
17. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
18. OVE GRANSTRAND, CORPORATE INNOVATION SYSTEMS. A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF MULTI-TECHNOLOGY CORPORATIONS IN JAPAN, SWEDEN AND THE USA
(2000), available at http:/lwww.lem.sssup.it/Dynacomlfiles/D21_O.pdf.
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a legal obligation, in not spreading information about it. First, an IP
manager's knowledge would tend to have arisen from a privateering
operation that his firm conducted and one still possibly not known by
the target, hence the manager has everything to lose and nothing to
gain by discussing the strategy. Second, most IP managers, even IP
managers whose firms employ the strategy themselves, would prefer
that no one else knows about it. One would not likely expect the IP
manager for a major corporation to appear in a public forum, for
example, and provide detailed instructions to other companies' IP
managers on how to go about privateering. Consequently, the
methodology of gleaning existing court litigations for nuggets of
information, which time consuming, may in some situations serve as a
robust data source.
Comparative case analysis has not been formally conducted
because no cases have yet been found where the sponsor lost. 9 Thus,
of the known privateering cases, the sponsor has achieved a
consequential benefit from all of them. If privateering were to
become more common as a strategy, then not only will there be more
cases, but there will likely be a great diversity among the cases that
lends itself to a comparative analysis. Similarly, if the raw investor
data becomes available, then a great deal of analysis can be
performed on investor-side IP privateering.
D. Outline of the Article
Part I has provided background information about IP
privateering, including the methodologies that have been employed
to probe the limits of this strategy. Part I explains how present law
may be used to curtail anticompetitive and market manipulative
privateering but further observes that effective curtailment may
require the intervention of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and/or the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ). Part II also examines those forms of privateering that
are not clearly anticompetitive or market manipulative and concludes
that these forms of privateering will likely continue in the short-to-
medium term and may require the intervention of the legislator if
their curtailment is desired. Part III discusses aspects of the
infrastructure that supports privateering and concludes with a
19. Excluding the IMS case, which was conducted for a relatively small amount of
money by Intel. See In re Int'l Meta Sys., Inc., No. 1:98-bk-10782 (W.D. Tex. 2002) and
Ewing, supra note 1, at 135-36.
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discussion of how a present patent oversupply seems to facilitate
privateering.
II. The Target's Possible Counterclaims Against the Sponsor
A patent defendant may often find its own litigation counsel not
terribly interested in investigating whether the plaintiff may have a
sponsor. After all, the issue at hand is whether the defendant
infringes the asserted patent(s), and not how the plaintiff was enticed
into filing the lawsuit. Finding a sponsor provides no defense to
infringement.
Assume that you are the CEO of YoungCo, a young innovative
company that has developed a replacement technology for the
present industry standard for Widget Z. Your company has been
sued for patent infringement by NPE LLC.20 Your patent attorneys
tell you that you are likely to win the case if it goes to a final
judgment-some years from now. The chairman of the board has
told you that several prospective investors have backed away since
the lawsuit was filed. Your litigators have told you that NPE's
representatives will not discuss settlement beyond 15% of the
company's gross receipts, which you know would be an unsupportable
sum even if the patent was valid and infringed. The CTO tells you
that while he was at an annual industry gathering, he heard rumors
that NPE LLC was actually funded by LargeCo, the largest
manufacturer of conventional Widget Zs. Does one retaliate?
"There's not a lot of money in revenge," 21 essentially sums up the
target's position-unless the target can discover the sponsor's
identity, and then things may change. Knowing that a litigation has
been sponsored may provide a helpful tool in settlement. The
sponsor's greatest goal often involves discretion. For example, if
Company A discovers that Company B has sponsored a privateer's
lawsuit, then Company A can approach Company B for settlement
terms and/or threaten retaliation. In many instances, retaliation may
simply involve making the privateering operation public. Stealth is
typically a critical element in IP privateering and the advantages of
privateering may vanish if the sponsor's actions see the light of day.
20. Not all corporation records have been searched, but Delaware records show that
there is no "NPE LLC" incorporated in Delaware, although there are firms with NPE in
their names.
21. THE PRINCESS BRIDE, (Act III Communications, 1987).
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Rule 7.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
litigants to disclose their parent corporation and any publicly held
corporation owning 10% or more of their stock.22 The law imposes
this rule on all litigants. The law's purpose is not to discover litigation
sponsors, but to assist judges in disqualifying themselves due to
conflicts of interest.23 Rule 7.1 can easily be circumvented by the
resourceful sponsor. Individual courts may impose additional
disclosure rules, but none of the disclosure rules requires disclosure of
a litigation's sponsor. Some jurisdictions use a local variation of Rule
7.1 known as a "Certification as to Interested Parties," or Local Rule
7.1-1, which states:24
L.R. 7.1-1 Certification as to Interested Parties. To enable the
Court to evaluate possible disqualification or recusal, counsel
for all non-governmental parties shall file with their first
appearance an original and two copies of a Notice of Interested
Parties which shall list all persons, associations of persons,
firms, partnerships and corporations (including parent
corporations clearly identified as such) which may have a
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, including any
insurance carrier which may be liable in whole or in part
(directly or indirectly) for a judgment that may be entered in
the action or for the cost of defense. Counsel shall be under a
continuing obligation to file an amended certification if any
material change occurs in the status of interested parties as, for
example, through merger or acquisition, or change in carrier
which may be liable for any part of a judgment.25
These additional disclosure rules have proven more effective in
revealing potential sponsors than Rule 7.1. For example, Intellectual
Ventures involvement in several cases was not disclosed under Rule
7.1 but was later disclosed under Local Rule 7.1-1, including one case
in which a major portion of its own investors was disclosed 6
However, even this more inclusive local rule does not necessarily
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1.
23. See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE LITIGATION
MANUAL (Matthew Bender, 2010).
24. For example, the Central District of California follows Local Rule 7.1-1. U.S.




26. See, e.g., Certification of Interested Parties from Oasis Research LLC v. Adrive,
No. 4:10-cv-00435-MHS (E.D. Tex. 2010) (disclosing the financial involvement of
"Intellectual Ventures Plateforce Computing, LLC.").
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require disclosure of parties with whom the plaintiff is in contract,
owes a debt, or the disclosure of parties that encouraged the filing of
21the litigation but have no actual stake in its outcome . Such a
requirement in normal civil litigation could require an onerous
amount of disclosure.
Likewise, the records for public companies can be less than
revealing, while being completely open. The onus on corporate
record keeping is to account for how corporate funds have been
spent.2 This simply means that the expenses related to privateering
must show up in the company's books somewhere. This does not
mean that the company's books need a line item that reads
"privateering against Competitor X." For a company with more than
$1 billion in annual turnover, camouflaging an expense of a few
million (or less) should not be difficult. After a bit of explanation, the
company's auditors will also likely not object to the company's books
since the activity is legitimate and not obviously illegal. Thus,
following the money is not typically possible in privateering cases."
Of course, privateering is not illegal per se, so there's little incentive
for insider whistleblowing, although an insider threatening to reveal
all to a competitor target could possibly make for troublesome
blackmail.
The following sections provide an overview of the legal causes of
action and options that a privateering target might be able to employ
against a privateering sponsor once the target has learned that a
litigation has been privateered. The target's opportunities for
revenge against a sponsor should increase significantly once the target
can obtain litigation sanctions against the privateer, but the basis for
the sanctions will typically lie in the inapplicability of the IPR used
for privateering and not initially in the privateering itself.
A. The Target's Counterclaims Paired with Sponsor Backgrounds
Most of the target's counterattacks depend on first obtaining
litigation sanctions against the privateer. This will remove the
privilege otherwise accorded plaintiffs in civil litigation. The target's
avenues for obtaining sanctions against the privateer come from
showing that the litigation is frivolous, that the plaintiff lacks standing
27. Central District of California follows Local Rule 7.1-1, Supra note 24.
28. BARRY ELLIOT & JAMIE ELLIOT, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING
134-156 (12th ed. 2010).
29. This would be remarkably enlightening if it were possible.
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to sue, and possibly from inequitable conduct associated with patent
prosecution. The target could theoretically bring an action under the
Kobe antitrust cases3" without obtaining sanctions against the
privateer, although the target would need to make a convincing case
against the sponsor for attempting to monopolize a given area.
Similarly, the target could bring an action for market manipulation
against an investor sponsor, but the practicalities of a target obtaining
sufficiently detailed transaction information to bring suit would seem
to be exceptionally difficult."
Sponsor Possible Cause of Action Note
Operating If Litigation Sanctions Target likely has to
Company & Awarded Against Privateer, breach the formal
Investor then possible causes of action corporate structure
include: behind the privateering
Tortious Interference, effort organized by the
Antitrust, Patent Misuse, and sponsor to succeed
Conspiracy
Operating Antitrust under Kobe The Target will have a
Company heavy burden in proving
an attempt to
monopolize
Investor Market Manipulation, Insider Target likely has to
Trading, and Conspiracy breach the formal
corporate structure
behind the privateering
effort organized by the
sponsor to succeed
B. Litigation Sanctions Against a Privateer
Many, if not most, of the potential causes of action that a target
might have against a privateering sponsor require some showing of
wrongdoing on behalf of the intermediary privateer before the
sponsor's potential liability can ever be reached. As a strategy against
privateering, targets may file more motions for sanctions against
privateers during litigation and press harder for courts to grant their
sanction motions. The primary form of potential litigation
30. Discussed in Part II-G, infra.
31. On the other hand, an agency with investigation powers such as the SEC could
relatively easily align its data regarding stock trades in public companies against litigation
filings and investigate linkages between the two.
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wrongdoing for most privateering cases would presumably lie in
bringing an action that should never have been brought, e.g., a
frivolous litigation.
Sanctions against a litigant may be appropriate when there has
been inappropriate conduct related to a matter in litigation, such as
litigation misconduct, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that
violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, or similar infractions."
Absent misconduct in the litigation, sanctions may be imposed against
the patent plaintiff only if both (1) the litigation is brought in
subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless."
This standard presents a fairly low bar to hurdle for the reasonably
conscientious privateer and sponsor.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the central purpose of
Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings- 4 Attorney fees for the prevailing
party in a litigation may be warranted for misconduct "if both (1) the
litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is
objectively baseless."" Even when monetary sanctions are awarded
under Rule 11, courts have held that sanctions should not replace tort
damages but instead focus on the discrete event of the offending
filing.36 The injured party in a patent case is to be placed, as near as
may be, in the situation it would have occupied if the wrong had not
been committed.37 Apart from Rule 11, federal courts possess an
inherent power to sanction bad faith litigation conduct. In addition,
attorney fees can be awarded to a prevailing party in a patent case
under 35 U.S.C. § 285 whenever the case is proven to be exceptional.
The privateering target will have to overcome the presumption
that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted patent is made in
32. See, e.g., Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050-51
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Beckman Instruments, Inc., v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
33. Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 508 U.S. 49,
60-61 (1993); see also Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1329-31 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
34. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
35. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
36. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 552 (1991).
37. 35 U.S.C.A. § 285 (West 2011).
38. Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (district court not required to
exhaust all other sanctioning avenues before exercising its inherent power); see also North
Am. Watch v. Princess Ermine Jewels, 786 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
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good faith.3 9  Thus, the underlying improper conduct and the
characterization of the case as exceptional must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.40 For example, a losing plaintiff in a
patent case typically avoids sanctions by showing that it undertook
reasonable pre-litigation steps such as obtaining infringement
opinions, conducting an infringement investigation, making claim
charts, and serving notice of infringement on the defendant.4' Even
for an exceptional case, the decision to award attorney fees and the
amount thereof are within the trial court's discretion .
As a further aid to the privateer, the enforcement of patent rights
that are reasonably believed to be infringed does not entail a special
penalty just because the patentee is unsuccessful, although the
entirety of a patentee's conduct may be considered in determining
whether to award sanctions.43 In addition, a duly granted patent is a
grant of the right to exclude all infringers.
The U.S. Supreme Court has advised appellate courts to apply
"an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing a district court's Rule
11 determination., 45  Before awarding Rule 11 sanctions, a district
court itself must conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine (1)
whether the complaint or the relevant document is legally or factually
"baseless" from an objective perspective, and (2) if the attorney has
conducted "a reasonable and competent inquiry" before signing and
filing it.
46
39. Springs Willow Fashions, LP v. Novo Indus., LP, 323 F.3d 989, 999 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
40. Beckman Instruments v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F 2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
41. See Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1386.
42. See S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (even an exceptional case does not require in all circumstances the award of
attorney fees).
43. See generally National Presto Indus., Inc. v, West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1197
(Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The trial judge's discretion in the award of attorney fees permits the
judge to weigh intangible as well as tangible factors: the degree of culpability of the
infringer, the closeness of the question, litigation behavior, and any other factors whereby
fee shifting may serve as an instrument of justice.").
44. The United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920) ("The
law does not make mere size an offense.").
45. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
46. Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Buster v.
Greisen, 104 F.3d 1186,1190 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a "court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney[s'] fees to the prevailing party., 47  Section 285
must be interpreted against the background of the Supreme Court's
decision in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc.48 There, the Court recognized that the right
to bring and defend litigation implicated First Amendment rights and
that bringing allegedly frivolous litigation could only be sanctioned if
the lawsuit was "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits., 49 Only if the
challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the
litigant's subjective motivation."
Relying on Professional Real Estate, the Federal Circuit has held
that absent misconduct during patent prosecution or litigation,
sanctions may be imposed against a patent plaintiff "only if both (1)
the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is
objectively baseless."'" The Federal Circuit has held that an
infringement action "does not become unreasonable in terms of
[§ 285] if the infringement can reasonably be disputed. Infringement
is often difficult to determine, and a patentee's ultimately incorrect
view of how a court will find does not of itself establish bad faith."52
Under this rigorous standard, the plaintiff's case must have no
objective foundation, and the plaintiff must actually know this. Both
the objective and subjective prongs of "must be established by clear
and convincing evidence., 53  The Federal Circuit recognized a
"presumption that the assertion of infringement of a duly granted
patent is made in good faith. 54  To be objectively baseless, the
infringement allegations must be such that no reasonable litigant
47. Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
48. Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 508 U.S. 49
(1993).
49. Id. at 60.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Wedgetail Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., 576 F.3d 1302, 1304-06
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (refusing to find patentee's unsuccessful case exceptional under Brooks
Furniture).
52. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
53. See Wedgetail, 576 F.3d at 1304.
54. See Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1382, (citing Springs Window Fashions LP v.
Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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could reasonably expect success on the merits:" Other potential
counterclaims, such as antitrust, do not factor into this analysis.
As previously mentioned, sponsors and privateers have reasons
for being stealthy. Avoiding sanctions in the event that they lose a
case presents another reason for sponsor stealth. While not
technically actionable, a court aware of privateering might view the
plaintiff privateer and the sponsor in a less favorable light. The
Federal Circuit, for example, prefaced one sanctions award by
describing the plaintiff's triumphant conduct as follows:
As stated in its 1987 Annual Report, Refac's primary business is
licensing and technology transfer, with a staff of patent law experts
"prepared to litigate without financial risk to its clients." According
to Refac's then president, Phillip Sperber, "It only makes sense to use
the cost of litigation as a bargaining leverage to force a settlement on
terms favorable to the party that can litigate the matter to death
without worrying about the cash flow." Sperber, Overlooked
Negotiating Tools, Les Nouvelles, June 1985, at 81. -6
These prior remarks likely harmed Refac's arguments against its
own liability for sanctions. Consequently, discretion should remain
an ever more useful tool for privateers and their sponsors.
C. Corporate Formalism and Privateering Organizational Structures
The privateering target that succeeds with a Rule 11 motion
and/or locates an appropriate cause of action that could be used
against a privateering sponsor may discover that the sponsor relied
upon various corporate formalisms to create difficult obstacles to
hurdle. The typical sponsor, as discussed below, has access to capital
and legal resources and has likely prepared for most adverse
contingencies.
Among other things, the sponsor's legal counsel has likely
constructed a corporate structure that will minimize the legal claims
that can be brought against the sponsor directly. Many known NPEs
have fairly complicated ownership and management structures. For
example, Searete LLC is a fairly well-known Intellectual Ventures
55. Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH, 524 F.3d 1254, 1260
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
56. Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1990) (citing Refac
Int'l, Inc. v. IBM, et al., 710 F. Supp. 569, 571 (D.N.J.1989)).
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shell company.57 IV parks many of its "inventioneering" patent
applications in Searetei' Searete is a Delaware company with a
presence in Nevada.59 Searete's official manager in Nevada is
"Nevada Licensing Manager, LLC," which is a Nevada corporation. 6
Nevada Licensing Manager's own manager is "Nevada Assets, LLC,"
which is a Delaware Company.6' At some point, Nevada Assets, LLC
presumably connects with Intellectual Ventures, LLC or one of IV's
many investment funds. In short, the ownership and management
structures for NPEs can be complicated, and various state corporation
laws complicate the process of finding out who the real directors and
managers are for a given limited liability company."
Fig. 1 illustrates a possible ownership structure for a privateering
operation. As shown in Fig. 1, a target has been sued for patent
infringement by a privateering company. The privateering company
is owned by an "owner 1" company and at least one other investor.
The "owner 1" company is itself owned by an "owner 2" company
and at least one other investor. The "owner 2" company is owned by
the sponsor and at least one other investor. The investors themselves
could presumably be "friends" of the sponsor (e.g., major investors).
The structure set out in Fig. 1 may be fairly easy to understand, once
57. John Letzing, Microsoft's Big Brains Spill Into Patent Firm, MARKETWATCH,
(Feb. 4, 2009, 6:07 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/microsofts-big-brains-spill-
over-patent.
58. Id.
59. Delaware Corporations file 3776428 shows that Searete LLC was formed on Mar.
12, 2004. Division of Corporations - Online Services, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, https://delecorp.delaware.gov (search "3776428") (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
Nevada Corporations records show that Searete LLC, Nevada Corporate ID
NV20041267664 was registered in Nevada on Nov. 15, 2004. Business Entity Search,
NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/CorpSearch.aspx
(search "NV20041267664") (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
60. Id.; Nevada Corporation records show that Nevada Licensing Manager, Nevada
Corporate ID NV20041268216 was created on Nov. 15, 2004. Business Entity Search,
NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, http://nvsos.gov/sosentitysearch/CorpSearch.aspx
(search "NV20041267664") (last visited Oct. 9, 2011 ).
61. Delaware Corporations file 3881571 shows that Nevada Assets, LLC was also
created on Nov. 15, 2004. Division of Corporations - Online Services, DELAWARE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://delecorp.delaware.gov (search "3881571") (last visited
Oct. 9, 2011).
62. Nevada, for example, is known for being particularly respectful of such
information. Some but far from all foreign corporations laws are also protective of such
information.
WINTER 20121 IP PRIVATEERING LIMITATIONS
128 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
the information is revealed.63 However, all the target may know in
some instances is the ownership of the privateer, and a court may be
reluctant to grant additional discovery for finding the owners of
Owner 1 without first having some showing of a cause of action
against the owners of Owner 1 by the target, and similarly may be
even more reluctant to grant discovery related to the owners of
Owner 2, especially if the court can be persuaded by Owner 2's
counsel, among others, that such inquiries amount to harassment.6
Thus, explaining to a court that the sponsor is the party who has
motivated the action of the privateer may be difficult to articulate
given the corporate formalisms and number of other parties involved.
The plaintiff-side parties would all presumably claim that their
interest in the litigation was simply to seek redress for the financial
loss engendered by the defendant's infringement. Creating this
ownership structure would only require a few thousand dollars in
legal costs and government fees."5
Figure One. Example Ownership Structure
Webvention, LLC, mentioned above, provides a real-life
example of an ownership structure that is possibly even simpler than
the one shown in Fig. 1 yet has baffled many observers.6 Webvention
63. This analysis has been conducted from the target's point of view. The tax
authorities would be better positioned to understand the ownership situation, but this
information would not necessarily be available to the target.
64. The structure may be even more difficult to unravel if Owner 2 instead of having
an ownership interest in Owner 1 is instead a secured creditor of Owner 1.
65. A Delaware Limited Liability Company can be established for as little as $285.
Delaware Incorporation Services from The Delaware Company, THE DELAWARE
COMPANY, http://www.thedelawarecompany.com/quote and-compare.asp (last visited
Oct. 16,2011).
66. Josh Rosenthall, Is Nathan Myhrovld's Intellectual Ventures Behind The 1OS In-
App Purchase Patent Troll Job?, EDIBLE APPLE BLOG (May 13, 2011), http://www.
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obtained a group of patents from Ferrara Ethereal, LLC, a well-
known Intellectual Ventures shell company in 2009. The Webvention
patents were obtained by merger of Ferrara Ethereal, a Nevada
corporation, into Webvention, a Texas company.67 On the same day
that Webvention, LLC was created in Texas, a Webvention Licensing
LLC was also created.' The Texas filing papers also mention a
Delaware company named Webvention Holding, LLC.69  The
corporate filing papers for Webvention were signed by an attorney on
behalf of the companies' owners. 0 This same attorney has signed all
the power of attorney documents filed with the USPTO. One filing
paper mentioned that the attorney was working for Philip Vachon,7
who may possibly be the president of Liberate Technologies and the
Interstate Baking Company.72
However, the exact ownership for these Webvention companies
remains uncertain, and even though Webvention has sued a number
of different companies for infringement, no further information has
been forthcoming publicly. Webvention's staff appears to be
independent of Intellectual Ventures. Further analysis by some
researchers has led to suspicions that Webvention may be more
tightly tethered to IV than previously believed. 3 In any event, even a
web of as few as three companies can be used to thwart public
knowledge of ownership. The only public parties, excluding
government agencies, who could pierce this information barrier are
attorneys operating under a broad discovery order in litigation, and
edib leapple.comlis-nathan-myhrovlds- intel lectual -ventures-behind-the-ios-in-app-
purchase-patent-troll-jobl#comments; J. Damus, Is Intellectual Ventures Behind Apple 1OS
In-App Purchase Lawsuit Threats? We Think So., WIRELESS GOODNESS BLOG (May 15,
2011), http://www.wirelessgoodness.com/201 1/05/15/is-intelectual-ventures-behind-apple-
ios-in-app-purchase-lawsuit-threats-we-think-so/; Joff Wild, Is Intellectual Ventures
Making A Big Move To Snare Apple As A Licensee?, IAM BLOG (May 16, 2011),
http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detai.aspx?g=c28a272d-3afd-49f6-9d64-aaa2ff595e97.
67. See USPTO assignments on the Web, U.S. PATENT OFFICE (July 25, 2011),
http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (search in "Assignor Name" field for
"Ferrara Ethereal," showing execution dates to Webvention on Nov. 16, 2009).
68. Corporate filing records available from the Texas Secretary of State's office.
69. Delaware Secretary of State records indicate that Webvention Holdings was
created on July 22, 2009.
70. Corporate filing records, supra note 68.
71. Id.
72. See Philip A. Vachon Appointed to IBC Board of Directors, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar.
6, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/philip-a-vachon-appointed-to-ibc-
board-of-directors-51635777.html.
73. See Rosenthall, supra note 66.
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even these attorneys may have to conduct their inquiry under a
discovery protective order that may prevent them from sharing this
information even with their client. In short, a target might know after
a litigation has been filed something about the ownership of the entity
that has sued it, but the target is highly unlikely to have any guarantee
about knowing who owns the entity prior to the litigation if the entity
wishes to cloak its ownership.
A corporation is normally regarded as a legal entity separate and
distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors. Under the alter
ego doctrine, however, where a corporation is used by another entity
to perpetrate fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other
wrongful or inequitable purpose, a court may disregard the corporate
entity and treat the corporation's acts as if they were done by the
persons actually controlling the corporation.74
The U.S. Supreme Court itself has said that a key predicate in
disregarding corporate formalities is whether a new party to a case is
not a distinct legal entity from the party already in the case. In the
structure set out in Fig. 1 above, the sponsor is formally a distinct
legal entity from the privateer.75 Like the Supreme Court, California
courts recognize that "[a]lter ego is an extreme remedy, sparingly
used."76 Thus, the target will almost certainly have to address the
alter ego doctrine, also known as "piercing the corporate veil," in
order to bring an action directly against the sponsor. Much of alter
ego law comes from state law which for patent cases will be applied
by federal courts operating within state borders.77
In order to disregard corporate formalities, the target will need
to show: (1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporations no longer exist and (2) that,
if the acts are treated as those of one corporation alone, an
inequitable result will follow." The issue is whether in a particular
case and for the purposes of that case, "justice and equity can best be
accomplished and fraud and unfairness defeated by a disregard of the
74. See, e.g., Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 4th 980, 993 (1995).
75. See Neon v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 470-71 (2000).
76. Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 539 (2000);
accord Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003).
77. See Levander v. Prober, 180 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999); Katzir's Floor &
Home Design, Inc. v. M-MLS.com, 394 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2004).
78. See Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 795 (1957); Sonora
Diamond, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523 at 537-39; Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co.,
210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 838-40 (1962).
[Vol. 4:1
distinct entity of the corporate form."79 The burden of proving alter-
ego liability lies with the moving party"'' by a preponderance of the
evidence.'
Targets seeking recompense (and revenge) may also have to
contend with the general rule that there is only one final judgment in
a litigation. 2 In other words, if a target seeks sanctions against a
privateer for bringing a case and not the sponsor, then the target may
have difficulty later bringing an action against the sponsor if the
sponsor can convincingly argue that the target could have brought the
action against the sponsor during the first case.
While the occurrence and knowledge of privateering cases is
relatively low, the typical target will be more likely not to retaliate
against the sponsor by filing a counterclaim. The barriers provided by
legal formalisms alone are likely sufficient to thwart the typical
target's counterattack until judges become more sensitive to the
issues. One of the reasons for bringing a privateering case is to create
management distraction-plotting revenge against a sponsor could
possibly result in an enormous management distraction for the target
and have inadvertently furthered the sponsor's goals.
D. Lack of Standing and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Sponsors who retain too many rights in the patents they provide
their privateers may find their proxies' cases dismissed for lack of
standing. This particular issue is most likely to arise in those
privateering cases where the sponsor has either outsourced a portion
of its litigation/licensing efforts to a proxy and/or where the sponsor is
distrustful of the privateer.
This standing and subject matter jurisdiction issue arose recently
in Picture Frame Innovations, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co.3 Picture
79. Kohn v. Kohn, 95 Cal. App. 2d 708, 708 (1950).
80. Minifie v. Rowley, 202 P. 673, 676 (1921).
81. Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology Int'l, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1012, 1017 (1999).
82. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §577 (West 2011) ("A judgment is the final
determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding."); see also Vallera v.
Vallera, 148 P.2d 694 (1944) ("There can be but one final judgment in an action, and that
is one which in effect ends the suit in the court in which it was instituted, and finally
determines the rights of the parties.").
83. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Eastman Kodak Co.'s Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Picture Frame Innovations, LLC v. Eastman
Kodak Co., No. 1:09-CV-04888, 2010 WL 5342828 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2010) [hereinafter
Kodak's Motion to Dismiss].
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Frame Innovations (PFI) had purchased a patent from Viviana
Research LLC,A likely one of Intellectual Ventures shell companies."
The Niro, Scavone law firm represented PFI, thus ironically linking
IV's vice chairman Peter Detkin with Ray Niro, the attorney for
whom Detkin coined the well-known invective "patent troll.
8 6
Standing issues could arise in a privateering case having a similar
factual background to the PI case. The outcome would depend on
precisely how the sponsor and privateer worded their purchase
agreement for the asserted patent. Kodak brought a motion early in
the PI case seeking to have the case dismissed on the grounds that
PFI did not obtain sufficient rights from Viviana in order to bring the
lawsuit.87 Kodak argued that "The question for this Court to decide is
whether IV (through Viviana) can succeed in its attempt to
'outsource' enforcement of patents against certain enumerated
targets, all the while retaining substantial rights for itself. . . ."
Kodak enumerated five patent rights retained by Viviana and asked
the court to compare the sales document by which Viviana acquired
the patent against the sales document by which Viviana sold the
patent to PFI, arguing that PFI only obtained a "hunting license"
from Viviana which did not confer standing. 9 PFI opposed Kodak's
motion,% and the case settled without the court having ruled on it.9 It
is not presently known what role, if any, that the motion played in the
parties' settlement discussions.
84. Patent assignment query of "Viviana" showing an execution date to PFI of June 8,
2009, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://assignments.uspto.gov/
assignments/?db=pat (search in "Assignor Field" field for "Viviana"; then follow "PAT#"
link).
85. See Tom Ewing, A Study of The Intellectual Ventures Portfolio In the United
States: Patents & Applications, 2nd Edition, Version 2.4 (May 2011) (Sample Report), at 7
(downloadable from http://www.avancept.com/Publications.html.).
86. Zusha Elinson, Intellectual Venture Takes Indirect Route to Court, Recorder, Sept.
1,2009.
87. Kodak's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 83.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. Picture Frame Innovations, LLC's Consolidated Opposition to Eastman Kodak
Co.'s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Picture Frame
Innovations, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:09-CV-04888, 2009 WL 5778257 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 5,2009).
91. The PFI case settled on undisclosed terms on Jan. 5, 2011. Agreed Order of
Dismissal, Picture Frame Innovation, LLC v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:09-CV-04888,
2011 WL 1326089 (N.D. Il1. Jan. 5, 2011).
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Standing issues may arise from two separate grounds-
constitutional standing and prudential standing. Constitutional
standing cannot be cured after a plaintiff has filed its lawsuit.
Standing to sue is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining an
action in federal court. To establish standing in accordance with
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the plaintiff must show: (1) an
injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the defendant's action
and injury; and (3) that the injury can be redressed by the relief
requested." To establish prudential standing, the plaintiff must show
that: (1) the case rests on the plaintiff's own legal rights and interests
and not those of third parties; (2) the harm caused to the plaintiff
does not involve an abstract question best left to the representative
branches, and (3) the plaintiff's complaint falls with the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statue or constitution
guarantee in question.93
A plaintiff has standing to sue for patent infringement only
where it holds "all substantial rights" in the patent." When a plaintiff
lacking sufficient rights brings suit, that plaintiff lacks prudential
standing to sue on his own, and the suit must be dismissed, or
additional holders of rights under the patent must be joined as parties
to the suit, e.g., as appropriate given the plaintiff's status as either an
exclusive or a nonexclusive licensee. Where a plaintiff receives
patent rights pursuant to an agreement, whether the agreement
conveys standing on the transferee depends upon whether the parties
intended the transferor to surrender all substantial rights in the
patent.96
The Federal Circuit has held that if a plaintiff lacks constitutional
standing under Article III, the suit must be dismissed, and the
jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by the addition of a party with
92. See Hein v. Freedom Religion Found, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 587 (2007); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570 (1992) (Article III standing must be present at the
time the party brings suit); Steel Co. v Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998)
(arguing that standing cannot be conferred by agreement of the parties).
93. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 484-
485 (3d Cir. 1998).
94. Alfred E. Mann Found. For Scientific Research' v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("A patent is, 'in effect, a bundle of rights, which may be divided and
assigned, or retained in whole or in part."' (citation omitted)).
95. Id.
96. See Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro-Italia SpA, 944 F.2d 870, 874
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
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standing.97 Only the party that owns or controls all substantial rights
in a patent can enforce rights controlled by that patent.'" The transfer
of the exclusive right to make, use, and sell products or services under
the patent is vitally important to an assignment. 99 In those instances
where the plaintiff has Article III (constitutional) standing but lacks
prudential standing, then a later assignment of the patent may cure
this standing defect."'
The mere transfer of rights solely for enforcement purposes is
not enough to create standing, according to the Federal Circuit.' ' In
addition, the right to sue is illusory and carries no weight where that
right has been undercut by transferor's retained right to license the
litigation targets.'O2 Thus, sponsors and privateers need to be careful
in how they craft agreements, especially in outsourced licensing
scenarios.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)"'3 authorizes a court to
dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
the plaintiff's claim, or the plaintiff lacks standing to bring its claim.
Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or
factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. In
reviewing a factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction,
the court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint, and no
presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations9
The court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, including
affidavits, depositions, and testimony, to resolve any factual issues
97. See Schreiber Foods, Inc. v Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 402 F.3d 1198, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Paradise Creations, Inc. v. U V Sales, Inc., 315 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Gala Techs., Inc. v. Reconversion Techs., Inc., 93 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (arguing
that a subsequent purchase of an interest in the patent in suit does not confer Article III
standing).
98. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). See
generally Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
99. Alfred E. Mann Found'n v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(citing Propat Int'l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187,1191 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
100. lpventure, Inc. v. Prostar Computer, Inc., 505 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
101. See Alfred E. Mann Found'n, 604 F.3d at 1360; AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med.,
LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
102. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that a licensee's right to grant royalty-free sublicenses to defendants sued by the licensor
rendered illusory the licensor's right to sue).
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
104. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).
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bearing on jurisdiction."" Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), subject matter
jurisdiction may be challenged at any time during the course of a case
and may be raised sua sponte by the court."° Once the court's subject
matter jurisdiction over a complaint is challenged, the plaintiff "must
bear the burden of persuasion" and establish that subject matter
jurisdiction exists. If the court has already rendered a judgment,
Federal Rule 60(b)(3) provides relief from judgment where there has
been fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.1
E. Patent Misuse and Unclean Hands
The patent misuse and unclean hands doctrines may not provide
much assistance to the average privateering target. Patent misuse is
an affirmative defense for patent infringement and/or mitigation of
infringement damages that may be used in instances where the
plaintiff patent owner has engaged in a fairly short list of bad acts."
These bad acts include:
- Improper expansion of the patent's term or scope;
- Inequitable conduct in the procurement or enforcement
of the patent; and
- Violation of the antitrust laws.
The Federal Circuit has characterized patent misuse as the
patentee's act of "impermissibly broaden[ing] the 'physical or
temporal scope' of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect."10
The patent misuse doctrine is closely tied to the equitable defense of
"unclean hands." Equitable defenses tend to be available as defenses
for equitable remedies,"' although the U.S. Supreme Court tied
"unclean hands" to patent misuse nearly 100 years ago.'12
105. See Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176,179 (3d Cir. 1997).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
107. Kehr Packages Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991).
108. Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 939, 959-60 (E.D.
Wis. 2004), affd, rev'd on other grounds 402 F.3d 1198,1202-05 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
109. See, e.g., B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495,499 (1942).
110. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
111. Equitable remedies tend to be remedies other than the payment of damages, such
as remedies that involve an injunction or require specific performance of an action.
112. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Univ. Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)
(holding unenforceable a restriction that a user of a patented film projector must use it to
screen only such films as the patentee authorized); see also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (tie-in between patented salt dispenser machine and
unpatented salt).
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The patent misuse doctrine that arose in the case law has been
further circumscribed by statute. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress enacted Section 271(d) of the Patent Act
not to broaden the doctrine of patent misuse, but to confine its
boundaries. ' Patent misuse under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) states:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having done one or more of the following:
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent;
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if
performed without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent;
(3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or
contributory infringement;
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or
(5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the
sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license
to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate
product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent
owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
conditioned.
4
The wording of Sec. 271(d) does not implicate activities like
privateering as an exception; hence, patent misuse is still theoretically
possible under the "expansion" and "antitrust" prongs discussed
above. If the inequitable conduct prong arose in a privateering case,
it would more likely pertain to acts performed by the original owner
of the patent and not the privateer or its sponsor, as inequitable
conduct tends to occur during patent prosecution and privateering
involves only issued patents.
The Federal Circuit, recognizing the narrow scope of the patent
misuse doctrine, has emphasized that the defense of patent misuse is
not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a patentee
engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even conduct
113. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,201 (1980).
114. Subsection (d) amended Nov. 19,1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, § 201,102 Stat. 4676.
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that may have anticompetitive effects."5 So, even if privateering is
"morally wrong" or an "economic danger," patent misuse is unlikely
to provide the target with a specific legal avenue to demonstrate that
it was been harmed.
When found, patent misuse renders a patent unenforceable, but
the period of unenforceability ends if the patent owner can
demonstrate "purge" of the misuse-that the misuse has been
abandoned and the consequences of the misuse fully dissipated.' 6
Patent misuse also has been found in certain circumstances in which
conduct did not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.1 17  It
generally has been held, however, that the challenged misuse must
relate to the patent-in-suit.''8
The Federal Circuit has further stated that "[t]he key inquiry [for
patent misuse] is whether, by imposing conditions that derive their
force from the patent, the patentee has impermissibly broadened the
scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.""' 9  In a
privateering case, the typical privateer will not have imposed any
conditions on the target and will thus not have expanded the scope of
the patent grant although arguably expanding the business uses of the
patent grant.
F. Duty of Disclosure & Inequitable Conduct
New patent owners sometimes file broadening reissue
applications for newly acquired patents. 21' In such instances, the new
owner assumes the duty of disclosure to provide the USPTO with
115. Princo Corp. v Int'l. Trade Comm'n., 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
("Although the defense of patent misuse ... evolved to protect against 'wrongful' use of
patents, the catalog of practices labeled 'patent misuse' does not include a general notion
of 'wrongful' use.") (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
116. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l. Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465,472-73 (1957).
117. Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that
violation of the antitrust laws requires more exacting proof than suffices to demonstrate
patent misuse).
118. See, e.g., Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492-93; Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal
Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 84 (6th Cir. 1971) ("The misuse must be of the patent in suit.").
119. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Monsanto
Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
120. Permit Assignees to File Broadening Reissue, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/strat2l/action/lrlfp55.htm (last modified Sept. 20, 2007); see also Tom
Ewing, A Study of The Intellectual Ventures Portfolio In the United States: Patents &
Applications, 2nd Edition, Version 2.3 (May 2011) (Sample Report), at 19 (downloadable
from http://www.avancept.com/Publications.html.).
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pertinent information, especially information related to prior art.
12'
Likewise, during litigation, it is fairly common for patents to enter
into reexamination, and in reexamination, the new owner will
likewise assume the duty of disclosure. 22 While this duty implicates
more owners than just privateers and sponsors, it could theoretically
provide a line of defense due to inequitable conduct in cases where
the target learns that the sponsor itself has knowledge of pertinent
prior art (e.g., is itself a large patent holder.)
Where the owner has not satisfied the duty of disclosure, then
the patent may become unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
123
The inequitable conduct analysis comprises two steps: (1) a
determination of whether the conduct meets a threshold level of
materiality and intent to mislead and (2) a weighing of the materiality
and intent in light of all of the circumstances to determine whether
the applicant's conduct is so culpable to render the patent
unenforceable.'24
G. Antitrust
A patentee may exploit his patent but may not use it to acquire a
monopoly not embraced in the patent grant."' The line dividing
lawful patent conduct and antitrust violations and patent misuse has
varied over the years with changes in statutes, judicial opinions, and
concepts of what is equitably proper.26 Much of recent patent and
antitrust jurisprudence relates to patent misuse as well. 27" 28
121. All patent applicants have an affirmative duty to prosecute patents in the PTO
with candor and good faith. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
122. Information material to patentability in ex parte reexamination and inter partes
reexamination proceedings,37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (2011).
123. Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee breaches his or her duty to the PTO
of "candor, good faith, and honesty." Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178
(Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), vacated 374 Fed. App'x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
124. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
125. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643 (1947).
126. See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 28 (2006).
127. Id. at 40 ("Although the patent misuse doctrine and our antitrust jurisprudence
became intertwined in International Salt, subsequent events initiated their entwining.").
128. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Princo Corp., 173 Fed. Appx. 832 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating
trial court's grant of summary judgment to patentee of no patent misuse on the grounds
that the district court erred in treating 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) as a definition of patent
misuse that precludes a finding of patent misuse unless the tied patents involved multiple
products).
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Antitrust jurisprudence typically relates to what one company
can do with its own patents rather than its motivation of third parties
to use their patents in ways that might be anticompetitive between the
motivating party and a third party. IP privateering necessarily
involves third-party IPRs, rather than one's own IPRs, with the
possible exception of privateering as outsourced licensing. In any
event, it would seem reasonably clear that one would be unlikely to
motivate a third party to do something with one's patents that one
could not do on its own without invoking antitrust issues.
If a patent owner initiates litigation seeking to enforce a patent
that is known by the patentee to be invalid, such action can be an
unlawful attempt to monopolize under Sec. Two of the Sherman
Act. 29 This is, of course, true for all plaintiffs and hiding a patent
under a privateering arrangement should not change the analysis,
although it might make for an interesting factual situation where the
sponsor knew of a patent's invalidity but the privateer did not know
of the invalidity and vice versa.
Along similar lines, there is an exception to the general antitrust
immunity conferred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine that relates to
sham litigation activities. 3 ' Under this sham exception activities
"ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action" do not
qualify for Noerr immunity where they are "a mere sham to cover...
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor.'' 3. The Supreme Court added that a litigation cannot be
deprived of immunity as a sham unless it is "objectively baseless.'
' 32
An assumption, however, in this analysis of IP privateering is
that sponsors and privateers will act to avoid all potential liability
from privateering and not act recklessly in the litigations that they
bring. Similarly, the sponsor and privateer would seemingly avoid
liability under present law in nearly all cases so long as the patent
litigations that they brought had some objective basis.
Targets may seek to find a cause of action analogous to that of
Article 101 of the European Commission which finds potential
anticompetitive effects in:
129. 15 U.S.C.A. §2(West 2011).
130. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961).
131. See Prof'I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 51 (1993) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).
132. Id.
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"[AIll agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market ....
This article will not explore whether privateering per se
constitutes a sufficient competitive "distortion" under Art. 81, but
one suspects that it would depend upon (1) how fully the Commission
understood the sponsor's privateering plan and (2) how extensive the
effect of such plan was, especially when viewed from a consumer
point of view. Under such an analysis, the factual situations for some
privateering scenarios would still likely elude sanction although many
of them would likely be proscribed.
Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act is worded somewhat similarly to
Article 101, stating:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine ....
But one difference between the Sherman Act and Article 101 is
that the Sherman Act implies that a party's "illegal" actions have
provoked an anticompetitive result whereas Article 101 seems less
concerned, on its face, about whether the underlying act was legal or
illegal.
The Kobet35 line of cases provides a small group of antitrust cases
that may be helpful to the privateering target and come somewhat
closer to Article 101. In Kobe's patent infringement case, the plaintiff
had purchased some seventy-plus key patents in the hydraulic oil
pump technology)3 6 The court found that one could not possibly
make a competitive product without infringing one of the patents,
and the defendant had been found to infringe several of the patents. '37
133. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Art. 101 (ex. art. 81 TEC),
Mar. 25,1957, O.J. Cl15 Mar. 9,2008.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 2, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/215/usc sec 15
00000002----000-.html.
135. Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
136. Id. at 420.
137. Id. at 423-25.
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Thus, the patent litigation was in no way a sham. The court stated
that while there was nothing inherently wrong with purchasing a
patent and enforcing it against an infringer, the intent and underlying
purpose of accumulating such a large number of patents amounted to
a violation of antitrust laws and patent misuse."'
While providing a narrow exception to the Noerr-Pennington
litigation immunity, the Kobe cases could benefit privateering targets.
These cases could possibly be most easily applied to the outsourced
licensing scenarios-although in those scenarios, the sponsor has not
typically acquired a group of patents for the purpose of being
anticompetitive; rather the patents already exist and the sponsor
wants to exploit them against a specific target. An interesting
question would be how readily the Kobe line of cases could be
applied to a company like Intellectual Ventures that set out to amass
one of the largest patent portfolios in the United States and then
collect revenue from licensing the portfolio 3 9 Whether Kobe would
apply beyond the outsourced licensing form of privateering remains
somewhat doubtful, but could possibly be applied by a court that
found that the sponsor's activities were objectionable and should be
sanctioned.
H. Insider Trading and Market Manipulation
Privateering sponsors, especially investor sponsors, will likely
need to structure their operations to avoid potential liability based on
securities laws and regulations. As with many forms of privateering,
certain sponsors may have legal and/or fiduciary duties based on their
positions in other entities that will not arise for sponsors who stand in
different positions.
Insider trading relates to the trading of a corporation's stock or
other securities (e.g., bonds or stock options) by individuals with
potential access to non-public information about the company.140
Insider trading frequently refers to a practice in which an insider or a
related party trades in the market using material nonpublic
information obtained during the performance of the insider's duties
at a corporation, or otherwise in breach of a fiduciary duty or where
138. Id. at 426-27
139. See Ewing, supra note 85.
140. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) ("That the relationship
between a corporate insider and the stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a
disclosure obligation is not a novel twist of the law.").
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the nonpublic information was misappropriated from the company.141
Insider trading is prohibited by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,142
and generally requires that anyone in possession of insider
information must either disclose the information or refrain from
trading.1
43
The SEC acknowledges that insider trading is a difficult crime to
prove. 44  The underlying act of buying or selling securities is a
perfectly legal activity. It is only what is in the mind of the trader that
can make this legal activity a prohibited act of insider trading.'
45
Direct evidence of insider trading is rare. Insider trading is typically
detected by examining inherently innocuous events and drawing
reasonable inferences based on their timing and surrounding
circumstances to lead to the conclusion that the defendant bought or
sold stock with the benefit of inside information wrongfully
obtained.
46
The investor privateering scenarios discussed in the companion
article could potentially involve the use of insider information,
especially the privateering scenarios where the sponsor bases his
knowledge about target selection using information that is otherwise
confidential. However, many forms of privateering do not require the
use of insider information, as most forms of privateering do not
concern securities trading and are not conducted by traders and
brokers.
Greater potential liability for privateering sponsors arises from
market manipulation under Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) and of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.'47  Market
manipulation describes a deliberate attempt to interfere with the free
and fair operation of the market by creating artificial, false or
141. Thomas C. Newkirk, Associate Director, SEC Division of Enforcement & Melissa
A. Robertson, Senior Counsel, SEC Division of Enforcement, Speech by SEC Staff:
Insider Trading-A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the 16th International Symposium on
Economic Crime (Sept. 19, 1998).
142. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 111-257, 48 Stat. 881 (2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf.
143. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) affd in part, rev'd in part 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
144. Newkirk, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Rule l0b-5, (codified as
amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951)), available at http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/
text-idxc=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowsefTitlel 7/17cfr240_main_02.tpl.
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misleading appearances with respect to the price of, or market for, a
security, commodity or currency.'48 Whether a bona fide patent
infringement litigation could be considered as market manipulative as
tactics such as "pump and dump," "painting the tape,"'' 9 and a "bear
raid"' "° remains somewhat unclear. There is likely a point at which it
would be difficult for a sponsor to avoid liability, especially if the
sponsor owed a fiduciary duty to a third party impacted by the
privateering effort.
The general anti-manipulation provision of Section 9(a)(2)
outlaws "every device used to persuade the public that activity in a
security is the reflection of a genuine demand instead of a mirage.""'
Even a small price change suffices. 52 A motive to manipulate, when
joined with the requisite series of transactions, prima facie establishes
the manipulative purpose and shifts to the accused the burden of
going forward with the evidence.'53 Unlike Sec. 10(b), Sec. 9(a)
expands the scope of potential liability beyond persons with a
fiduciary duty such as corporate officers, advisors, and stock brokers.
Market manipulation obviously harms the market by tampering
with the flow of genuine market information.1 4 In a market without
manipulators, information seekers unambiguously improve market
efficiency by pushing prices up to the level indicated by the informed
party's information but overall market efficiency becomes less certain
148. Market manipulation is punishable under Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Litigation
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges George Georgiou, a Canadian Citizen, For
Market Manipulation Schemes, (Feb. 12, 2009) (available at http:l/www.sec.govllitigation
litreleases/2009/1r20899.htm).
149. "When a group of traders create activity or rumors in order to drive the price of a
security up." An example is the Guinness share-trading fraud of the 1980s. In the US, this
activity is usually referred to as "painting the tape." Painting the Tape Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/paintingthetape.asp (last
visited Oct. 10, 2011).
150. A bear raid is an "attempt by investors to manipulate the price of a stock by
selling large numbers of shares short." Bear Raid, ANSWERS.COM, http://www.answers.
com/topic/bear-raid?cat=biz-fin (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
151. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969).
152. U.S. v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 846 (2nd Cir. 1972); Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 SEC
559, 571 (1945) (1/2 point on a $50 stock).
153. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., Inc. v. Am. Fid. Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602,
616 (5th Cir. 1979).
154. Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Guojun Wu, Stock Market Manipulation-Theory and
Evidence (Mar. 11, 2003), available at https://alumni.ou.edu/content/dam/price/CFS/paper/
pdf/aw39.pdf.
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in the presence of manipulation. The situation becomes more clearly
detrimental to market efficiency as competition for shares increases. '55
Many of the market manipulation cases relate to either direct
manipulation of the market or actions caused to manipulate the
market coupled with a statement about the market. Undertaking an
action such as filing a patent infringement case under the belief that it
will affect the price for a given stock and then buying or selling the
stock based on that belief seems to be a few degrees away from direct
market manipulation-and the privateering sponsor does not need to
make a statement, although publicity about a litigation could arguably
constitute a statement.
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a
standard for materiality of misstatements in the SEC Rule 10b-5
context by holding "materiality depends on the significance the
reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented
information., 156 In Basic, the Court rejected a proposed bright-line
rule for determining the materiality of a specific piece of
information.157 In its place, the Court called for a fact-specific case-
by-case inquiry.
18
In the typical market manipulation case, either corporate officers
have deliberately taken actions in the marketplace that differ from
their public statements15 or a stock broker or corporate insider has
made similar market misstatements." In one of the few patent-
related market manipulation cases, a corporation's officers were
excused from liability because they demonstrated that they had




The Supreme Court has pointed out that not every instance of
financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under Sec. 10 (b).1
62
In Chiarella, the Court found no liability for a printer under Sec.
10(b) because he was not a corporate insider and he had received no
155. Id.
156. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,240 (1988).
157. See id. at 236.
158. See id. at 239.
159. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) affd in
part, rev'd in part 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
160. See SEC v. Tambone, 597 F. 3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010).
161. See Gompper v. Visx, Inc., 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002).
162. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1980) (citing Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,474-77 (1977)).
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confidential information from the target company-and the "market
information" that he relied on to trade in the market did not concern
the earning power or operations of a target company but only its
plans to acquire another company.1
6
1
In Chiarella, the Court also noted that the case lacked the
printer's "duty to disclose" because no duty arose from the from
printer's relationship with the sellers of the target company's
securities because the printer had no prior dealings with them. The
Court noted that the printer "was not their agent, he was not a
fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their
trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt
with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.' ' '6 The
Court concluded that to find the printer guilty would essentially
create a general duty between all market participants to forgo actions
based on material, nonpublic information.'65 Thus, it would seem that
in many privateering scenarios, even some investor privateering
scenarios, that the sponsor would likely not incur any potential
liability under many possible scenarios.
I. Tortious Interference and Conspiracy
Keeping with the nautical theme of privateering .... Off the
coast of Cameroon about 200 years ago, a group of local residents
paddled their canoe out to the Bannister, an English ship that had
been loaded with goods for trade.166 As the canoe paddled back to
shore, presumably to bring back others to trade with the ship, the
canoe was struck by cannon fire from another ship, the Othello,
killing at least one of the men onboard the canoe. Capt. McGawley,
commander of the Othello, was determined that the locals would not
trade with anyone else until they had settled a debt that he believed
they owed him. When the Bannister returned to England, its owners
sued McGawley for tortious interference with their prospective
163. Id. at 231.
164. Id. at 232-33.
165. Id. at 233.
166. OBG Limited v. Allan, Douglas v. Hello! Limited and Mainstream Properties
Limited v. Young [2007] UKHL 21 at paragraph 8 (May 2, 2007) (citing Tarleton v.
McGawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793) (In unlawful means the defendant must have
intended to cause damage to the claimant as a means of enhancing his own economic
position. Because damage to economic expectations is sufficient to found a claim, there
need not have been any intention to cause a breach of contract or interfere with
contractual rights.).
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business in Cameroon.'67 In rendering his decision, Chief Justice
Kenyon noted that McGawley had no right to take the law into his
own hands and therefore he owed a debt to the Bannister and its
owners for driving away their business with deadly cannon fire." But
Justice Kenyon added that there would have been no case had the
Othello driven the prospective customers away by accident or by legal
169means.
Over time, the rule of Tarleton v. M'Gawley has become known
as tortious interference with business relationships. This tort might
represent the best hope for targets who have uncovered a
privateering effort by a competitive rival. Unfortunately, without first
getting the court to agree to sanctions for litigation conduct (the
equivalent of firing a cannon), then the target's task may be
impossibly difficult.
Tortious interference is a common law tort that occurs when one
intentionally damages another's contractual or business relationships.
One branch of the tort comprises impairing an existing contractual
relationship and the other branch comprises interfering with business
relationships, generally. Tarleton dealt with this later branch of the
tort since the Bannister had no contract with the locals who were fired
upon by the Othello.
Tortious interference with business relationships occurs where
one party prevents another party from successfully establishing or
maintaining business relationships. 70 Thus, the first party's conduct
intentionally causes the injured party not to enter into a business
relationship with a third party that otherwise would likely have
occurred. 7'
Although the specific elements required to prove a claim of
tortious interference vary from one jurisdiction to another, the
elements typically include the following:'72
1. The existence of a contractual relationship or beneficial





171. Such conduct is termed tortious interference with prospective business relations,
expectations, or advantage or with prospective economic advantage.
172. Builders Corp. of Am. v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 482, 484 n.1 (N.D. Cal.
1957), revd. on other grounds 259 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1958); P.G.& E. v. Bear Stearns &
Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126 (1990).
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2. Knowledge of that relationship by a third party;
3. Intent of the third party to induce a party to the relationship
to breach the relationship;
4. Lack of any privilege on the part of the third party to induce
such a breach;
5. Breach of the relationship; and
1736. Damage to the party against whom the breach occurs.
Consider, for example, the case of two companies competing for
a supply contract with a larger company where one of the two
competitors sponsors a privateer to make the other company look
bad before the potential customer. All the elements of the tort are
satisfied-save for the lack of privilege element. The sponsor should
retain the privilege to sue the target for patent infringement in all
circumstances-so long as the sponsor's infringement case is not
frivolous. If the case is frivolous, then the privilege may be lost.
The intent element of this tort has often been difficult for
plaintiffs to prove in many types of cases.1 74 The tortious actor needs
to have the purpose to cause the result, and if he does not have this
purpose, his conduct does not subject him to liability under this tort
even if it has the unintended effect of deterring the third person from
dealing with the plaintiff.7 1 It is not enough that the actor intended to
perform the acts which caused the result-he or she must have
intended to cause the result itself.76 For privateering cases, one could
imagine this element, however, not being terribly difficult to prove
against a sponsor, although it might be impossible to prove it against
certain privateering arrangements.
To prove tortious interference, the injured party must also prove
that there is a reasonable probability that the lost economic
advantage would have been realized but for the tortfeasor's
interference. 77 For some privateering cases, this element may also
provide an extra layer of defense for the sponsor.
Interestingly, there is an important limitation to the use of
tortious interference as a remedy for the disruption of contractual
173. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal.3d 815, 827 (1975).
174. P.G.&E., 50 Cal. 3d at 1127 (quoting Justice Tobriner that the actionable wrong
lies in the inducement to break the contract or to sever the relationship, not in the kind of
contract or relationship so disrupted).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, (1979).
176. Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 766
(1984).
177. Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 70-72 (1987).
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relationships-a party to an existing contract cannot, as a matter of
law, commit or conspire to commit a tortious interference with the
contract.78 The tort can only be asserted against strangers to the
relationship.'79 Tortious damages are not typically available in
contract cases, and courts have explained that allowing one party to
bring tortious interference against another party to a contract would
introduce a class of damages not contemplated under the contract
laws.' s  Of course, the injured party could still sue over breach of
contract, although punitive damages will likely not be available.
Thus, tortious interference will likely not be available to targets in
many of the scenarios discussed above.
As a sign of how difficult it can be to succeed with a tortious
interference case, consider the plight of a small patent intermediary
named iLeverage. 8' In 2010, Allied Security Trust (AST), a patent
defense aggregator somewhat similar to RPX, decided to sell some
patents that had been licensed to its members.'82 AST asked a
company called iLeverage to conduct a private auction for the
patents.' iLeverage sent auction solicitations to several companies,
including Limelight, a content-delivery company that has been locked
in a $45-million infringement litigation with much larger Akamai."'
In response, Limelight asked AST for a license to a patent mentioned
in iLeverage's solicitation and was denied. In March 2010, Limelight
then sued AST for declaratory judgment on the grounds that a
lawsuit was imminent.8 5  After a few weeks, AST and Limelight
settled their dispute with Limelight receiving a license to the patent.
In the meantime, the patent auction had been cancelled. In January
178. Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 514 (1994).
("[C]onsistent with its underlying policy of protecting the expectations of contracting
parties against frustration by outsiders who have no legitimate social or economic interest
in the contractual relationship, the tort cause of action for interference with a contract
does not lie against a party to the contract.").
179. Id.
180. Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 135 Cal. App. 990, 998-99 (1977) (emphasis
added); see also Shoemaker v. Myers 801 P.2d 1054, 1068-69 (Cal. 1990).
181. iLeverage, Inc. v Limelight Networks, No. CGC-11-507095 (SF Super. Ct. 2011).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Joff Wild, Suit alleges Limelight got licence [sic] from AST after filing a "frivolous





2011, iLeverage sued Limelight for tortious interference with contract
and tortious interference with a business relationship. Limelight
responded with a motion that iLeverage's complaint be stricken
under California's anti-SLAPP legislation. 18 6  In April 2011, the
California court agreed with Limelight that its earlier lawsuit against
AST had been privileged, 7 struck iLeverage's complaint and assessed
attorneys' fees against iLeverage for bringing the complaint.
A civil conspiracy, or collusion, comprises an agreement between
two or more parties to deprive another party of legal rights or deceive
the party to obtain an illegal objective. Any voluntary agreement and
some overt act by one conspirator to further the plan are the main
elements necessary to prove a conspiracy. Even when no crime is
involved, a civil action for conspiracy may be brought by the persons
who were damaged. But conspiracy is not an independent tort and
must be tied to a duty that at least one party already owes to
another. ' In the privateering realm, because the privateer has no
duty not to sue the target for patent infringement, then the fact that
the sponsor and the privateer have agreed upon a course of action
creates no tortious activity-so long as the patent infringement
lawsuit is well founded.
Conspiracies require an agreement between two or more persons
to break the law at some time in the future or to achieve a lawful aim
by unlawful means. 9 Conspiracies in violation of the securities laws,
such as the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, form another area of potential liability for both the sponsor and
the privateeri.' Both the SEC and the DOJ may bring legal actions
for conspiracies to violate the securities laws.
A few lower courts in California have applied conspiracy theory
to find that one contracting party could impose liability on another
186. Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Strike the Suite (Apr. 4, 2011 ) iLeverage,
Inc. v Limelight Networks, No. CGC-11-507095, (SF Sup. Ct. 2011). Some 20 states have
laws to prohibit what are known as "strategic lawsuits against public participation" or
SLAPP. The goal of a SLAPP lawsuit is to use legal tools such as libel and slander to stop
members of the public from expressing their opinions at public meetings.
187. Non-frivolous litigation is generally protected under the free speech provisions of
the First Amendment Prof'l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S.
49, 60-61 (1993).
188. Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1994).
189. See, e.g., BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 329 (8th ed. 2004).
190. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (2010); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 111-257, 124 Stat. 2646 (2010).
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for the tortious interference with that contract, '9' but the California
Supreme Court rejected this approach in Applied Equipment Corp. v.
Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd."2  The Court found that application of
conspiracy to contracts "illogically" expanded the doctrine of civil
conspiracy by imposing tort liability for an alleged wrong. The Court
noted, "One contracting party owes no general tort duty to another
not to interfere with performance of the contract; its duty is simply to
perform the contract according to its terms." Thus, privateering
against a party with whom the sponsor has a contractual relationship
does not give rise to any special duty and could possibly even be used
by a sponsor to lower its potential liability by arguing that the
privateering activities were simply a form of contract breach.
III. Equipping the Privateer
A. Privateering Infrastructure
No IP market intermediaries presently appear to offer
privateering services as such. Of course, many of the tasks needed to
prepare a privateering operation also pertain to regular service
offerings of existing IP intermediaries. Privateering could be engaged
as easily as contacting a licensing organization and telling them that
the client would like to invest in the litigation of a patent having X, Y
and Z characteristics. The sponsor could even provide a list of targets
for such a patent. The sponsor's investment could even take the form
of a general investment in the licensing organization itself rather than
an investment in a specific IPR assertion. This would give the
sponsor additional protection against discovery, and an investment in
a larger organization would also provide further insulation against
any potential legal liability. Of course, the facilitator's reputation
would be built on its discretion.
As discussed in the companion paper, 93 IP privateering is
facilitated by a ready supply of issued and active patents. The patent
oversupply, to the extent that it exists, has likely occurred because of
the coincidence of several factors. One part of the oversupply has
come from the accelerating IP competition that has led to an increase
191. Wise v. S. Pac. Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 664-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
192. Applied Equip. Corp., 869 P.2d at 459.
193. See Ewing, supra, note 1.
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in patent filings. But the legal standards for patentability are fixed. 94
Thus, increased application filings would not necessarily contribute to
a corresponding increase in patent grants. In any event, the
discussion below illustrates how a sponsor may utilize the abundant
supply of patents to his advantage.
B. Finding Suitable IPRs For a Privateering Operation
Fortunately for the would-be sponsor, a patent marketplace has
arisen in recent years that vastly simplifies obtaining a patent while
also preserving one's anonymity.95  Thousands of patents have
changed hands in recent years' 96 as defunct companies, independent
inventors, corporations, and others have sold IP assets to third
parties." Also fortunate for the would-be sponsor is that a lack of
ownership transparency in the marketplace provides anonymity in
many cases and at least provides confidentiality in most cases,
allowing companies to transact with just about any party with little
fear of public exposure.'98
The perfect patent for many privateering operations would be
one in which the patent's claims not only read on a key aspect of the
target's business but also read on a key aspect of the target's business
in a manner that implicates the target's managers. Thus, the
privateer's litigation would be more likely to disrupt the target's
management and effectively make the litigation more costly for the
defendant. Disrupting the target's managers amplifies the impact of
the privateer's litigation and brings further indirect rewards to the
sponsor. In short, the perfect privateering patent is one that delivers
a "headshot" to the target's management.
The sponsor can employ a range of special purpose entities
(SPEs) for the privateering option, although a limited liability
company is often the most appropriate SPE. If absolute stealth was
called upon, then the sponsor could consider approaching a law firm
194. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103. These conditions for
patentability have been essentially unchanged for more than 200 years.
195. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 310 (2010).
196. For example, Intellectual Ventures, founded in 2000, has alone acquired tens of
thousands of patents. See TOM EWING, A STUDY OF THE INTELLECTUAL VENTURES
PORTFOLIO IN THE UNITED STATES: PATENTS & APPLICATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2011) (sample
report) (downloadable from http://www.avancept.com/Publications.html).
197. Chien, supra note 195, at 313.
198. Id. at 319-20.
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or another intermediary and having the intermediary approach the
owners of various candidate patents to gauge their appetite for selling
the patent and/or joining the patent into the SPE. In the stealthiest
case, the existing patent owner could agree to representation by the
law firm, likely on a contingency basis,' 9' with a contribution of the
patent by the owner to the SPE and costs provided by anonymous
"investors." Various unrelated investors could even provide funds for
the costs of the litigation and possibly become owners of the SPE.
This approach also provides a mechanism for controlling the patent
owner. The investors would not necessarily be controlled by the
privateering sponsor but could be aligned with the privateering
sponsor, e.g., they could be investors in the privateering sponsor.
Thus, they would share a common interest with the sponsor but
would have no written obligations that would necessarily jump out in
discovery or clearly reveal the overall plan.
The privateer does not need to know the identity of the
sponsor.2  The privateer might even be encouraged to believe that
his patent had extraordinary merit that had been recognized by IP
specialists who would help him achieve the recognition and rewards
that he was due. The only parties who would even know the name of
the sponsor would be some of the investors, but there could
potentially be no contractual obligations between any of these parties
and the sponsor. The arrangement might possibly be discoverable
under the criminal conspiracy laws-if privateering were a crime, but
would likely be indiscoverable under the civil laws since the
arrangement comprises no legal or equitable cause of action.
So long as the privateer's litigation satisfied Rule 11, then there is
little that the target could do against the sponsor legally. 0' The target
either wins or loses the litigation. In many privateering scenarios, the
sponsor does not need the privateer to actually win the litigation. In
many cases simply bringing the litigation will satisfy the sponsor's
objectives while in others a modest settlement will satisfy the
sponsor's objectives.
Assume the worst case scenario for the privateer-the target not
only wins the case but also wins Rule 11 sanctions against the
privateer. In many circumstances, the amount awarded by the court
199. Note that contingency fee arrangements are not allowed in many countries.
200. See Lans v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 97-2523 (D.D.C. 1997); summary judgment
appeal heard as Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
201. See generally Part II, supra.
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would likely be trivial by the sponsor's standards .2 " Assume that the
SPE had insufficient funds to pay the sanctions. The sponsor could
supply one of the investors and/or the law firm with the funds to pay
the sanctions. If the privateer did not know the identity of the
sponsor, and the lawyers in the case were not sanctioned, then the
sponsor would even be free to simply walk away from the case.
The worst case scenario for the sponsor would be one in which
not only were Rule 11 sanctions awarded by the court against the
privateer but where the target had also discovered the identity of the
sponsor-only after all this had happened would it be possible for the
target to seek legal sanctions against the sponsor-and even then, the
target would need more than just suspicions in order to bring a
colorable case against the sponsor. Various legal formalisms can
likely be employed to protect the sponsor.2 °3 The simple fact that the
sponsor is merely an investor in the entity owning the asserted patent
will likely provide ample prophylactic in most situations. If
privateering becomes sufficiently widespread, then it is certainly
possible that some sponsor could become dangerously sloppy-but
for the moment, it has not proven difficult for sponsors to insulate
themselves from the potential pitfalls of their privateers' litigations.
C. The Ease of Locating Suitable IPRs For a Privateering Operation
The following example illustrates just how easy it can be to find
not one but many patents on a given technical subject. The entire
example was constructed in just a few minutes, could be done by any
patent attorney, and does not require any communications with the
present owner of the patent.
Assume a privateering sponsor wants to find a patent it can apply
against a manufacturer of mobile phone handset displays. The patent
need not be one that falls under a telecom standard 2°4 (e.g., an ETSI




obligations under a standards body. Searching the USPTO's public
patent database on March 1, 2011, revealed some forty-one issued
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), http://www.etsi.org
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011). ETSI is an independent standardization organization in
telecommunications with worldwide influence. ETSI has been successful in standardizing
various systems, such as GSM.
205. "Fair reasonable and non-discriminatory," the typical terms required of IPRs
associated with a standards body.
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patents whose claims recite "mobile," "phone," "handset," and
"display."2 "a This search was limited strictly to claims having these
specific terms and did not consider synonyms.2 7 One could then
apply further searches on the claims and specification to narrow this
list further to better satisfy a given sponsor's request. Of course, a
review of these patents' specific technical focus might reveal
inventions beyond merely an improved mobile phone handset
display, such as using a mobile phone handset display having these
features to accomplish for some particular purpose.
The privateering sponsor may want to weed out of the list
patents that are owned by large operating companies, as those will
typically be the most difficult IPRs to obtain on short notice and at a
reasonable price-unless the large company has already decided to
offer up the patents in the IP marketplace. Filtering the large
operating companies from the list above leads to some fifteen
patents." Of these fifteen patents, ten of them are owned by small
companies and five of them are owned by individuals. Each of the
five patents owned by individuals (nearly one-eighth of the total)
would constitute a raw set of candidates for a privateering operation.
The privateering sponsor could then review the file histories for
these patents, prepare preliminary claim charts, and conduct further
diligence regarding the inventors. File histories for patents issued
from the mid-2000s onward can be downloaded in seconds from the
USPTO21 free of charge and even earlier for patents issued by the
EPO;210 older patent file histories can be ordered from the patent
office at relatively minimal cost. Preliminary claim charts can be
prepared using the patent, its file history, and a review of the
prospective infringer's product and service offerings alone. Thus, a
privateering sponsor can review just about any potential patent to the
point of knowing if a credible case could be launched against a given
206. The interested reader can repeat this experiment by going to the USPTO's
advanced patent database, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm, and
entering the search term "ACLM/mobile and ACLM/phone and ACLM/handset and
ACLM/display."
207. Similarly, changing "mobile phone" to just "mobile" or to "phone" increased the
number of patents retrieved to 151 and 134, respectively.
208. USPTO Assignment Database, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat
(enables identification of patent owners).
209. USPTO PAIR Database, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (database of
file histories).
210. European Patent Register: Advanced Search, https://register.epo.org/espacenet/
advancedSearch?lng=en.
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target-all before ever contacting the IPR's owner. In fact, the
patent's owner can only shed light on some very specific issues related
to invalidity and ownership, such as whether a sales or public
disclosure bar arose prior to the filing of the application, whether
there is an omitted inventor, or whether there is an unrecorded sale
to another party or another ownership issue. Each of these issues
relates to the patent's potential impairment, generally, and has little
to do with the patent's applicability to a specific target.
The list above was located quickly (within fifteen minutes) using
nothing but publicly available tools from the USPTO's databases-
the issued patent database, 2' the patent prosecution database, 2 and
the assignment database. 23  The interested reader is encouraged to
visit these free databases maintained by the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office214 and search them for not just one specific term but for the
occurrence of several terms in the same patent document, especially
its claims. This exercise will give some depth to the notion of what
having nearly 8 million issued and 1.9 million active U.S. patents
actually means." '
The panoply of readily accessible subscription-based tools could
provide an even more sophisticated list of privateering candidates at
fairly minimal cost.216 Among other things, a variety of services offer
topographic mapping tools that illustrate the extent of patent
coverage in various technical areas. Many patent analysis tools were
developed in Japan early in the pro-patent era.27 While these tools
may have originally been developed more to manage portfolios in-
house, to perform patent clearances, and other benign activities, the
211. See USPTO Home Page, http://patft.uspto.gov/.
212. See USPTO PAIR Database, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.
213. See USPTO Assignments, http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat.
214. Alternatively, visit the Eurpoean Patent Office website for information on
European patents. EPO Home Page, http://www.epo.org/.
215. See Tomio Geron, IPO-Ready Open Table Hit With Suspiciously Timed Lawsuit,
Venture Capital Dispatch, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2009, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/
venturecapital/2009/05/1 9/ipo-ready-opentable-hit-with-suspiciously-timed-awsuit; Chris
Gaither, Google Settles Yahoo Patent Suit in Anticipation of IPO, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2004, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/10/business/fi-googlelO; Carol
Emert, Paypal IPO Party Spoiled by Rival's Patent Lawsuit, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 7,
2002, available at http:llarticles.sfgate.com/2002-02-07/business/17533265_1-palo-alto-s-
paypal-certco-trading-today.
216. See generally Aureka, http://aureka.micropat.com. (Aureka is one example
among several searching programs maintained by Thomson Reuters.).
217. See GRANSTRAND, supra note 18.
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same tools have ready application as means for locating IPRs to use
against others.
Figure 2 below illustrates a patent map generated across a wide
range of antenna patents in seconds using a fairly sophisticated
mapping tool.21 Tools such as these allow would-be sponsors to
rapidly locate suitable privateering candidates well before contacting
the present owner to discuss a possible sale. For example, using this
antenna map, a sponsor could locate patents by competitors in the
antenna space and then locate close patents owned by third parties.
Further investigation of these close third-party patents could provide
an alternative means for locating candidate privateering patents
under the assumption that the competitor's products would be as
close to the to the third-party patents as the competitor's patents were
close. How close the competitor products were to the third-party
patents would comprise a second step, and a step that could be
completely performed without requiring any contact with the present
owners of these patents. Having eventually developed a list of top
candidates, the sponsor could then begin contacting patent owners to
entice them into selling their patents and/or becoming privateers.




Innovations in IPR exploitation led companies and investors to
develop IP privateering as a tool for achieving larger competitive
goals. The sponsor's benefits do not typically arise directly from the
third party's case against a target but arise consequentially from the
changed competitive environment brought about by the third party's
IPR assertion.
Indirect exploitation of IPRs via intermediaries"9 does not per se
give rise to a specific legal cause of action against the sponsor. In fact,
the sponsor's potential legal liability rarely exceeds that of the third-
party privateer who carries out the sponsor's assertion plan. If the
privateer avoids liability, so does the sponsor in most instances.
Potential sponsor legal liability may give rise to causes of action
ranging from tortious interference in business relations to patent
misuse, as well as possible market manipulation charges and antitrust
problems. In some situations, the target may bring antitrust and/or
market manipulation claims directly against the sponsor regardless of
the merit of the privateer's case. For most sponsors, however, their
greatest potential liability rests on adverse business consequences,
particularly from public exposure of the sponsor's involvement.
Indeed, a sponsor's goals for a privateering operation are often
defeated by public exposure. For example, IP privateering only
thwarts the "mutually assured destruction" paradigm of defensive
patenting so long as the operating company sponsor's identity
remains hidden. Consequently, the sponsor typically makes every
effort to hide its involvement in a privateering operation.
Privateering scenarios can be shaped to fit many competitive
scenarios. Privateering may be used by operating companies to
change the technology adoption rate between an upstart technology
and an incumbent technology, to outsource the licensing of a larger
collection of IPRs, to change some aspect of the legal infrastructure,
and/or to generally build influence. Privateering may be used by
investors to grow existing investments by privateering against
competitors in a given technology area, to change the value of the
stock price of a public company to temporarily discount shares and/or
to facilitate short selling, to change a company's value during
219. As explained above, these intermediaries can perform more than a mere
"outsourced" litigation function. The intermediary's bringing of litigation against a target
changes the competitive landscape between the target and the sponsor to the sponsor's
advantage such that the sponsor often benefits whether or not the litigation succeeds.
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investment, and to recoup research costs. Outsourcing patent
litigation, one branch of privateering, allows companies to shape their
competitive environments and in some instances monetize their IP
rights at extremely low cost. There are presently few existing reasons
under U.S. law why the complete ownership structure behind a given
patent-holding entity must be publicly exposed. Ownership
intransparency coupled with the nearly complete transparency related
to patent documents themselves greatly simplifies the process of
equipping a privateering operation.
Privateering raises further questions about the oversupply of
active and available patents in the so-called pro-patent era and the
ease with which they can be acquired and asserted. Although
privateering per se gives rise to no legal or equitable cause of action,
whether the practice should be encouraged is another matter.
Privateering raises questions about the social utility of IPRs,
particularly patents. Even when existing legal causes of action may
theoretically come to the aid of the privateering target, the target may
still have daunting discovery issues related to finding the sponsor. In
market manipulation cases, the target may be unlikely to have the
relevant trading data or be able to match it with a party connected to
the privateering effort. Consequently, there may be a role for the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the SEC in monitoring particular
forms of privateering behavior and responding accordingly.
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